The liability of credit rating agencies ('CRAs') has been subject to critical debate since the global financial crisis of 2008. It has been well documented and argued that the rules governing such impositions have been traditionally framed by reactionary, post-crisis driven reforms which do not necessarily reflect, or capture, in economic terms, the consequentialist aspects of whether they are beneficial to the welfare of wider market participants. This article attempts to highlight, through economic analysis, some of these wider market repercussions, and will aim to do so by providing an analysis of liability rules from a Kaldor-Hicks efficiency perspective. It is hoped that this analysis will add further insight to the question of liability and regulation, chiefly in aiding our ability of determining whether current regulatory reforms on credit rating agencies, principally within the European Union, are sufficiently robust in addressing the problem of poor regulatory incentives.
Why efficiency?
The aim and purpose of liability rules may simply depend on one's philosophical conviction.
Generally, traditional legal scholars would argue two objectives of liability law: (1) compensation of victims for having unfairly suffered harm, and (2) the need to deter injurers from committing further harm.
11 From a strictly deontological perspective, such rules by themselves possess significant moral worth, not necessarily in the purpose to be attained by it, but in the maxim according to which the action itself is determined. 12 In the context of CRAs, we can assert that if one rating agency is proven to be negligent or fraudulent ex post, investors should be compensated for having unfairly suffered losses through having relied, assuming diligently, on inaccurate ratings. The setting of precedent then may, or may not, incentivise CRAs to produce more accurate ratings.
13
The recent Australian decision of Bathurst 14 is one example that echoed this moralistic bend, confirming that CRAs owed a duty of care to investors on the basis that rating agencies should have known that potential investors would rely on its opinion when determining the creditworthiness of rated products, in particular when making their decisions to invest. The assumption of foreseeability here is an example of an intuitive moral decree, as the outcome relies heavily on what one perceives to be sufficiently or reasonably foreseeable, and whether one should be penalised on that basis. 15 Whether or not such an approach would be validated by courts in other regions under the common law is yet to be seen. 16 Liability claims under the common law have for long echoed the Kantian foundations of moral absolutism, 17 ie that rights and duties specifically defined remain absolute as determined by the moral law. 15 This does not suggest that legal analyses under the rudiments of the common law function entirely on intuitive basis without any moral legitimacy. Rather, it attempts to highlight that the analysis could be more inclusive, particularly to wider and more extensive considerations beyond commonly-held moral intuitions. For a more extensive introduction, see Posner, 'Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory' (n 7). 16 For an analysis of potential liability claims in the UK, see Kern Alexander, 'Tort Liability for Ratings of Structured Securities Under English Law' (2015) 11 International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal 26. 17 Kaplow and Shavell (n 9).
of whether courts should utilise a strictly deontological approach in finding the appropriate assignment of rights and duties is not straightforward. The benefit of normative economic analysis lies in its consequentialist approach of law. 19 The complexity of financial markets means that wider economic considerations are usually pertinent when considering liability rules. Punishing agencies simply on grounds of rights and duties, or morality and justice, may not be as straightforward as it would be in other traditional liability claims such as murder, trespass, or theft, for example. Moral arguments for compensating investor losses are filled with contradictions. In financial markets, aspects of liability rules greatly impact the welfare of all market participants, as this article hopes to highlight.
20
This is not to suggest that cases of murder, trespass, or theft are less morally arbitrary (in fact, they very often are), but rather that adopting a consequentialist perspective aids our normative analysis of liability. 21 Efficiency perspectives are relevant not because they replace our deontological foundations of law. Instead, they illuminate conclusive normative directions to anyone for whom 'efficiency, or the particular concept of efficiency that the particular economist is advancing, happens to be the ruling value'. 22 In other words, in determining whether a particular rule or decision is efficient, we are then better able to come to a conclusion as to whether that rule or decision is morally acceptable. 23 Positive descriptions may further illuminate whether the current liability regime can be explained through the concept of efficiency. 24 Explicating these descriptions may then help us redesign our laws to achieve equally valid or even better moral ends, albeit utilising different logical inspections.
A positive and normative description of liability rules
Liability rules are established where there is some perceivable form of market failure which, given high transaction costs, requires the intervention of judges to help foster the transaction that 'free market transactions would have brought about had they been feasible'. 25 In this 18 For an introduction into the concepts of morality, law and economics, see Kaplow and Shavell (n 10). 22 Posner, 'Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory' (n 7) 110. 23 Posner, 'The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency' (n 7). 24 Posner, 'The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law' (n 21). 25 Posner, 'Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory' (n 7) 108.
sense, many commonly accepted moral rights are validated ex post by the efficiency criterion.
Where they conflict therefore should not necessarily lead us to decide one way or another, but rather exposes the similarities and deficiencies both approaches posit in our normative finding of the best possible solution. 26 Positive descriptions of law do not justify that efficiency be the sole criterion, but only that it explicates our logical consistency. A positive theory generates, in other words, empirically testable hypotheses often supported and refuted by our evaluation of the results. 
Assignment of duties and rights
In assigning rights and duties, the problem of arbitrary assignment abounds. A deontological approach may define our rights through clear assignment of duties, providing it with absolute moral worth on its own. 47 Posner, 'Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory' (n 7). 48 Posner, 'The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm' (n 7) 494. 49 KH-efficiency has more often formed the basis for policy decision-making given its more realistic methodology, as compared to Pareto-superiority and optimality. A reallocation is only a Pareto-improvement if one person is made better off without making any other person worse off. In practice, this is usually impossible. KH-efficiency focuses on potential improvements instead of direct efficiency goals in themselves (ie does a a system whereby compensation is paid and accepted ex post, ie in a Pareto-superior paradigm, is more costly than one in which compensation is not paid, or rather, not yet paid.
In wealth maximisation terms, the initial lower costs would maximise the stated goals of efficiency. Under a hypothetical compensatory scenario, one could also expect the overall social costs to be lower, given that claims are made through the test of negligence, not strict liability. 50 Wealth is maximised under this paradigm assuming only meritorious claims with plausible causes of action arise, with compensation fully provided only when successful.
51
It is important to further explicate the element of consent. Finally, note that the choice for opting for Kaldor-Hicks over Pareto-superiority is also a practical one. 55 The need to measure utility directly is near impossible, and to consider this amongst all groups in society on top of pecuniary allocation will often leave the Paretocriterion unsatisfied, as there is no way of determining whether the 'utility to the winners of not having to pay compensation will exceed the disutility of the losers of not receiving . 50 The lower cost in wealth maximisation terms is assumed given that there would be a lower number of claims made under a negligence regime compared to a strict liability one, as only meritorious ones with a sufficient probability of succeeding would arise. In the case of the recent financial crisis, for example, if a strict liability regime was adopted in the case of misratings, we can assume that the number of claims would have been extremely large, and hence the estimated social costs likely to be much higher. 51 Posner, 'Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory' (n 7). 52 ibid. 53 Posner, 'The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm' (n 7) 492. 54 See Kaldor (n 49); Hicks (n 49). 55 Posner, 'The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm' (n 7) 488.
compensation.' 56 In the context of financial markets, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency provides a far more administrable approximation, and hence forms the basis for assessment in this article.
Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency and Wealth Maximisation: A Criteria for Measurement
As aforementioned, the concept of wealth maximisation is assumed to be society's most efficient goal. 57 It is separate from utilitarianism in the sense that it is concerned not with the aggregate utilitarian effect of promoting overall happiness, but more with the maximisation of wealth in dollar terms.
58
Proponents of wealth maximisation do not necessarily answer the question of why wealth should be the goal pursued under conditions of uncertainty. 59 There are various normative and ethical foundations illuminating this question, most of which are beyond the scope of this article, 60 but 'whether rational choice under uncertainty would dictate the pursuit of wealth as opposed to, say, Rawls' two principles of justice, or to some variant of utilitarianism', 61 is a question that needs to be briefly considered.
The adoption of wealth maximisation alleviates arbitrary initial assignment of rights. 62 An objection to the moral adjudication of investors' rights and duties is that the assignment often provides no tangible criterion for justifying any one particular allocation of rights. The unified goal for all market participants in the financial sector is, presumably, the pursuit of wealth. There are few reasons one could think of for participating beyond that. The choice of wealth maximisation therefore serves a valuable basis for evaluating efficiency, irrespective of whether it is pursued for intrinsic or instrumental value. 63 In defining comparable states of affairs, a criterion for measurement is required simpliciter. The preference for measuring wealth as the desired efficiency criterion in this context is twofold. Wealth provides a more objective assessment in the context of CRAs and financial markets. In defining comparable states of affairs, the objective assessment of costs and benefits to financial market participants are plausible. 64 Wealth maximisation, unlike utilitarianism or utility, also better avoids the Scitovsky Paradox, 65 which is a relevant DOI: 10.14324/111.2052-1871.077
would mean considering a whole host of non-exhaustive factors, which in the context of financial markets would not be necessary, at least in explicit terms.
Let us assume therefore that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency deems outcomes as efficient when monetary wealth is maximised. 66 The key evaluation is society's willingness to pay in accordance to its assessment of alternative outcomes. 67 Consider, for example, two parties who enter into a voluntary arrangement that causes pollution to society. The initial arrangement would seem repulsive from a moral standpoint, but it would be considered a Kaldor-Hicks improvement if both parties are willing to compensate the victims of pollution.
In Kaldor-Hicks terms, wealth maximisation is realised. Applying this to the context of CRAs would mean a state where both CRAs and investors are willing to pursue their transactions (ie CRAs continue to rate, investors continue relying on ratings), with both parties willing to accept the level of compensation imposed (or not imposed), whether through liability rules or otherwise. Different standards of liability would alter the incentives of both parties to transact, potentially increasing or lowering the wealth of market participants and others.
Assignment of property rights under Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
In legal-economic analysis, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency can be utilised as a basis for considering different assignment of rights in finding one paradigm that truly maximises wealth. Say for example we have to decide on a policy of whether to allow the building of a factory in a quiet neighbourhood. Approving the policy would mean assigning new rights and duties to the factory owners (as well as other members). If -having taken into account all other possible costs and benefits to other members of the neighbourhood -they are considered the winners, given that they gain more than other members of the neighbourhood, the net gain in welfare is wealth maximising from a Kaldor-Hicks perspective, given the possibility for hypothetical compensation in pecuniary terms. The model is extreme in the sense that many non-pecuniary factors in the Paretian sense are ignored. For example, the utility or disutility from pollution, happiness levels, or discontentment in general are not measured, partly given the impossibility of the task. Paretoefficiency would therefore potentially provide a very different result. The article will now turn to consider the application of the Kaldor-Hicks paradigm to the CRA liability context.
D. KALDOR-HICKS EFFICIENCY: APPLICATION TO THE CONTEXT OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES

Rating agencies inside the Edgeworth-Boxley box
The difference between Pareto-optimality, Pareto-superiority, and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 74 This is an obscure but tenable form of assumed allocation of rights. In reality, both CRAs and investors have absolute rights to these factors (CRAs can rate whatever they want, investors can choose to rely on whichever rating they choose). However, for the benefit of this analysis, we require a feasible means to assume some form of allocative paradigm. We assume therefore with an increase in statutory mandatory reliance on a CRA rating, the right for investors to rely on their personal rating reduces. Likewise, the opposite occurs if statutory reliance is mitigated. The term 'personal rating' could be taken to mean 'personal credit assessment', by whatever means. K. The line x, y drawn through these points is the contract curve (although in this context there is no actual contract between third party investors and CRAs; however, we can assume the contract curve represents the willingness to rate and to rely on ratings).
L. Points b and c represent Pareto-optimal allocations that are also Pareto-superior to a.
M. The move from point a to f is Kaldor-Hicks efficient, since at f CRAs could compensate investors so that investors would be no worse off than at b, and CRAs would still be better off than both a and b (further from their origin).
75
Paragraph 13 describes wealth maximisation from a Kaldor-Hicks perspective. To further illustrate: at point a, investors would have to rely equally on the same amount of mandatory ratings as at f, except that they have a greater possibility for claiming compensation for losses at a than at f. If the liability regime is adjusted so that investors and CRAs move to point f, the initial presumption is that investors would lose out given the 75 Coleman (n 35) 514. I. the effective yield from rated bonds or securities being too low in relation to risks, which flows from the beginning of purchasing the overrated security; or II. maximum losses (ie principal sum plus expected yield or interest payments) in the wake of default of an overrated bond.
88
The causation element is difficult for investors to prove given that they would have to establish that reliance on the ratings was ex ante reasonable, despite the extra steps taken in the wider context of their due diligence.
89
With the imposition of statutory liability post-CRA III, the assignment of rights to investors and duties owed by CRAs are clearly enhanced. The breach of investors' property rights to fair and accurate ratings would trigger a plausible cause of action on two possible grounds:
82 Caparo (n 80). 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and CRA III: A positive analysis
A positive inquiry illuminates a relational property of states of affairs, 99 which if carefully considered, should reveal if one state of affairs (E') is more efficient than another (E) in Kaldor-Hicks terms, provided that those whose welfare increases in the move from E to E' are capable of fully compensating the losers, leaving E' with a net gain in welfare.
100
The interplay of rights and duties in this context would involve considering the allocation of rights between investors and CRAs before and after the implementation of Participating in financial investments, whether through relying on financial ratings or personal due diligence, incorporates the element of consent. 103 Financial market volatility is a presumed risk. Any reliance on credit ratings as an external certification functions on the premise of accepting marginal deviations from absolute certainty. 104 Perfect knowledge in our world is often misjudged as a locum for pretended knowledge, and any rational investor consents to these risks when incorporating rating information into his credit assessment.
105
The principle of consent reveals a fundamental problem with stringent liability regimes. Reliance on public ratings is even more problematic given that the decision to do so is voluntary. In publishing rating information, investors consent to whichever rating they opt to believe. If CRAs were a publishing company, a reader merely has to avoid reading the section if he or she believes there are grounds for substantial misinformation, or at least, grounds for deviation in opinions, risks and beliefs. But at the same time the principle of consent oversimplifies other important causalities. One may often read news from a reliable publishing company, say the British Broadcasting Channel (BBC), only to find the occasional misinformation. The question therefore is more appropriately addressed as to whether the ultimate suffering of harm for investors was so far removed that 'but for' the inaccuracy of public credit rating, the investor would have been better off.
106
Even if we were unable to elicit express consent in any case, a possibility given that it is a non-contractual reliance, 107 the finding of implicit consent should not be abandoned. 108 In finding that investors have relied on ratings, they have equally implied their confidence in the ratings, even if they have wavered away from their personal credit assessments. Laziness, oversight, or mechanistic reliance are not grounds for then avoiding personal due diligence in performing credit assessments. Doing so would only bolster the claim that investors consented, at least in part, given their indifference.
Positive analysis therefore reveals that investors are not in a worse position after the crisis by virtue of ex ante compensation. 109 In being part of a system of tort rules, a rational investor can be expected to perform accident-avoidance measures without ex post compensation. 110 If one were to invest based on the conviction of positive ratings, considering the relevant liability regime and factoring plausible liability claims are assumed ex ante measures.
However, to explicate the position as such in the context of financial markets would be an oversimplification. The complexity of the credit rating business, as described by many commentators, 111 posits fundamental problems underlying the theory of ex ante compensation. The aggressive desire to profit and conflicts of interest reveal the fundamental problem of consenting to relying on rating information of issuers who themselves pay for the rating by rating agencies. 112 The question is whether other forms of external certifications are sufficient to provide grounds for informed decision-making, 113 one that would consolidate the notion of consent. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion has to be modified in this sense, taking into account that consent prior to the financial crisis was severely obscured by the motives for financial profiteering. 114 The criteria for 'voluntary exchange' that is Pareto-optimal between participants is severely weakened in this sense.
The obscurity of consent: moving to a Kaldor-Hicks efficient paradigm
are rational and knowledgeable, the 'exercise of liberty leads to Pareto-optimal states of affairs through a series of Pareto-superior exchanges'. 116 As mentioned, the state of Paretooptimality is very difficult, if not impossible, to imagine in the context of financial markets. 117 Given the incompleteness of the theory of ex ante compensation previously, due to the obscurity of consent, it is fair to presume the existence of market failure by virtue of information asymmetries. 118 From a positive perspective, the liability regime under CRA III can be seen as an attempt to correct, or perhaps codify, a pre-existing allocation of rights.
Intervention in markets are based on some notion of market imperfection. 119 As underlined by Posner:
The role of government intervention in any case is to mimic or simulate the allocative forces of the free market through the imposition of legal sanctions, thereby providing for the proper allocation of resources that would have taken place under more desirable market conditions.
120
In a perfectly free market, free from third party and external effects, we can presume that an investor would have the right to rely on ratings, and CRAs the right to provide ratings, and both would exchange Pareto-superior transactions until they achieve a state of Pareto-
optimality. An investor would continue to rely on ratings as long as it benefits their investments; a CRA would continue to rate products as long as it continues to be profitable.
Both are wealth maximising transactions. Forbidding the transactions, unless assessed on some basis of market imperfection, would reduce both the wealth of society and personal autonomy. 121 The question of assignment of rights from a Kaldor-Hicks perspective therefore is whether the new assignment of rights enhances wealth and provides for a net gain in welfare.
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In considering investors' previous assignment of rights, the plausibility of ex ante compensation and consent are generally weaker given the lack of codification and clarity of avenues for redress. Consenting to reliance on ratings does not mean consenting to excessive risk-taking. 123 Nor does it mean consenting to fraudulent or grossly negligent misconduct.
Coleman's argument therefore aids our analysis in highlighting the need to bolster the criteria for consent and acceptance of ex post compensation levels.
But a fine distinction needs to be made clear. The enhancement post-CRA III, if any, is provided not from changing the consensual basis on which investors choose whether to rely on ratings. The intervention in the market is merely to mimic the implicit consensual basis of investors of not intending to go so far as to agreeing to any form of fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation. 124 This can be presumed to be the intention of any rational investor in a free market. The enhancement of wealth therefore lies with the possible realisation of ex ante incentives into ex post compensation, which, when realised, becomes a Pareto-superior exchange. 125 In contemporary contexts, therefore, with the codification of investors' property rights and personal obligations, the consensual element is merely codified to reflect an already existing implicit consent, but which provides for greater ex ante and, potentially, ex post compensation, assuming rational investors take note of both the risks and legal standards applicable when relying on ratings.
But an additional consideration is required. If one were to further consider elements of opportunity cost, the alternatives to investors for external certifications are not great. 126 Does this imply limitations on an investor's ability to consent freely? And if so, is it still wealth maximising from a Kaldor-Hicks lens for investors to be assigned rights to compensation?
The first can be answered simply on the basis that in any market with scarce allocation of resources, sellers and buyers would have to make informed decisions. This is no different from choosing products in any other free market, which provides varying degrees of quality, suppliers, and buyers. Limitation of consent should only be a concern when a transaction is completely, or for the most part, involuntary. In the context of financial investments, in particular with published ratings, this cannot be assumed. Intervention in this context would be analogous to a judge's imputation and rewriting of the parties' intention in a contractual transaction. 127 But assuming consent is obscured through misrepresentations and overrating, the right to compensation, as under the current regime, maximises investors' wealth from a Kaldor-Hicks lens as they are able to translate their intentions ex post.
128 123 Coleman (n 35) 533. 124 CRA III (n 10) art 35(a). 125 Coleman (n 35). 126 Choi (n 113). 127 Posner, 'Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory' (n 7). 128 Coleman (n 35).
rights of investors in tandem with CRAs. The enhanced liability regime equally alters the ex ante compensation and incentives for CRAs to rate, reducing their willingness to consent to providing their ratings given the fear of potential liability claims. This is an argument usually brought by many fearing that a liability regime would chill the industry due to the fear of litigation floodgates. 129 In economic terms, this would depend on how far off the indifference curve the CRA has been led to under the new liability regime (assuming above in Figure 1(b),   beyond points a, c, d ).
In the pre-CRA III context, mandated reliance on ratings and lack of liability meant that CRAs would have more likely (and quite easily so) consented to the obligation of providing published ratings. 130 The argument for lack of consent or autonomy in this case Assuming a hypothetical winner in this context is difficult. 133 However, in terms of reallocation of rights and duties, investors seemed to have gained more in pecuniary terms (and, potentially, in utilitarian terms, although this is beyond the scope of this article) 134 than
CRAs in this context. These aspects will be considered further from a quantitative perspective below.
E. NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY: A NORMATIVE INQUIRY
with the ideals of a free market are pertinent to determining whether wealth maximisation as a criterion can be satisfied. The different assignments of rights and duties here alter incentives for partaking in market transactions, and hence are relevant to our discussion. 136 The importance of this discussion comes from the fact that many arguments for a strict liability regime have been made. 137 Under strict liability, investors are allocated absolute rights and CRAs the duty to compensate for any resulting losses. This is problematic for several fundamental reasons. The foremost important aspect in this assessment is the principle of causality. 138 In its simplest terms, the causal paradigm of strict liability would mean: because 'A hit B, A is liable for B's damages'. 139 The assignment of rights is premised on moral absolutism, and ignores the reciprocal view of causation, 140 which in economic terms, would mean disregarding efficiency as a normative criterion.
Reliance on credit ratings for investment decisions forms only part of a host of relevant considerations. The assignment of absolute rights beyond that of the current context would lead to causation errors. 141 Market risks and financial losses are formed through a whole host of variable factors. In an even narrower sense, an investment decision cannot be formed solely on a credit rating alone. 142 To assume that credit ratings are the substantial or proximate cause-in-fact would be dismissive of other relevant factors. Brown's Economic Theory of Liability positively illuminates the causative context from an efficiency perspective: in any one output, there exists a variety of relevant inputs.
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Let us say we take the financial crisis as the relevant output that caused the eventual losses for investors, the probability of avoidance being denoted by P(X, Y, Z). 144 The X -avoidance costs for CRA, ie greater due care with providing ratings, etc;
II. Y -avoidance costs for investors, ie performing greater due diligence, reviews, etc;
III. Z -avoidance costs for issuers, ie issuing financial securities that are safe & reliable.
The three inputs (X, Y, Z) are reciprocally causative to the financial crisis. The question from an efficiency perspective is, on which combination of avoidance measures, X, Y and Z, and the resulting probability of an accident, P(X,Y,Z), is the most preferred in terms of minimising social costs? 145 From this perspective one could almost always argue that it should be Z, given the issuer's position with regards to internal information and ability to create safer financial products. 146 As one can imagine, the arguments can be rather circular without empirical data. But just to illuminate a figure for clarity: the value of collateralised debt obligations in the run-up to the financial crisis contributed to more than $2 trillion in losses and write-downs. 147 Unless we assume that credit ratings are the single, most efficient means of avoiding the probability of the financial crisis, which leads us to the social optimum of least avoidance and expected social costs, a strict liability regime would be substantially more costly. The internalisation of externalities and minimisation of social costs have equally been argued as more effective under a strict liability regime. 150 This is difficult to establish unless we adopt a non-consequentialist perspective. Strict liability would severely alter the incentives for CRAs to act as gatekeepers and, given the high concentration levels and barriers to entry in the certification market, would lead to a reduction in rating production and efficiency. 151 Whether enhanced liability would necessarily lead to more accurate ratings which inherently improve investors' rights is debatable. A socially optimal level of screening accuracy can only be truly incentivised by a competitive screening process, which requires enhancing competition levels. 152 One also needs to consider the increased probability of frivolous claims that would be made by investors, given the inefficient level of care that would arise with the ability to 'free ride' on ratings without being liable for investment losses (see Figure 2 [a]). 153 If the sum of these costs exceeds the net welfare derived from a strict liability regime, the system would serve no means toward achieving the wealth maximisation criterion. 154 With the current assignment of property rights, provided the courts can decide the optimal level of care that induces efficient bilateral precaution, both investors and CRAs could be induced to internalise the appropriate amount of costs and increase levels of precaution.
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The social cost function for bilateral precaution can be illustrated as the following: 
F. QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS OF THE KALDOR-HICKS CRITERION
From a quantitative aspect, we can see that the reallocation of rights has enabled investors to make stronger claims against CRAs. In the US, scores of investors have filed suits since the regulatory amendments brought under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010, with a good number reaching financial settlements. 159 In Australia, the Bathurst case resulted in a successful claim by investors for compensation of USD 18.8 million. Investors in the EU have yet to make a successful claim against a CRA. Nevertheless, the enhanced liability regime under CRA III clearly establishes the possibility for ex post compensation. The resulting greater probability for ex ante compensation (ie willingness to consent to the risks for relying on ratings, given greater clarity and confidence with avenues for redress) incentivises investors to continue relying on ratings, provided they do so nonmechanistically and with due care. In pecuniary terms, the ability to rely should help them make better investment decisions to gain greater financial yields in the long run.
For the sake of this analysis let us assume further that both factors (ie increase in compensation and reliance on ratings) are independent points of preferences. An increase in the possibility for claiming compensation does not necessarily lead to more investors relying on more ratings, given that some may prefer to maintain steady portfolios and perform their own due diligence. In this case, reliance on ratings may remain static. From a Kaldor-Hicks perspective, however, investors' wealth would still be improved, given the enhanced possibility for ex ante compensation compared to the previous allocation of ratings. In Figure   1 (b), this would be a movement from point x to point a, which represents an increase in hypothetical compensation and movement away from the investor's origin. 
. 164 We can therefore infer that most agencies have remained rather indifferent to the possibility of ex ante compensation. The argument falls back on the normative ground that justifies Pareto-superior exchanges. Actions freely consented to involve the exercise of liberty, and any such transaction that involves the exercise of liberty are wealth maximising. 166 One cannot approximate how or why wealth would be maximised otherwise. In the presence of a market failure barring potentially Pareto-superior exchanges, legal intervention is required to mimic free market transactions, or otherwise provide avenues for ex post compensation, or, in the case of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, ensuring ex ante compensation. As illustrated, assuming the legal standard of care is imposed at an efficient level, parties incorporate their expected costs of care and harm in justifying whether a particular transaction is to be concluded. The consequentialist means of risk estimation provides that any one transaction can be wealth maximising, unless market failures, presumably via information problems or transaction costs, intervene.
G. EVALUATION
The question of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency producing only empty wealth improvements therefore is answered on this basis of liberty and consent. Wealth does not mean producing anything of intrinsic value, but is instrumental to the achievement of other values. 167 Why would an investor rely on a rating, unless he would want to achieve greater returns on his investments? The initial transaction is wealth maximising in leading to the latter. If reliance on the rating does not lead to any greater intrinsic value, the former decision was wealth maximising on the basis of being exercised with liberty and consent.
H. CONCLUSION
This article has revealed that the CRA III regime is efficient from a Kaldor-Hicks perspective. The problem may be reduced to the theory of ex ante compensation. Wealth is maximised not when parties merely have the liberty to contract, but when they have the liberty to contract with full consent of the risks involved. In this analysis, consenting to risks pre-CRA III is, as mentioned, obscured by the complexity and aggressiveness of CRAs, in 165 Coleman (n 36). 166 Posner, 'Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory' (n 8). 
